Posts Tagged ‘Critique of Pure Reason’

Kant and Reason

Kant and Reason

The Eighteenth Century British philosopher, David Hume, suggested that we believed that there is a connection between cause and effect.  For example. fire causes flame and results in an effect of smoke.  Were it not for this belief system, we would be surprised every time we lit a match, saw fire, and witnessed the fire burn an object. Kant replaced Hume’s charge that cause and effect were mere metaphysical constructs with the idea of the a priori: mental structures possessed by human beings that allowed people to logically order empirical experiences in a rational fashion. We understand that “smoke” means “fire” not because one observes the effect of a lit match upon a dry leaf, but because one carries a preconceived concept of cause and effect in the mind.  Thus Kant replaced Descartes’s blind faith that God would not delude him with human reason and the powers of rational thinking.  Kant removed God from the philosophical equation. In his critique of Western philosophy, Kant realized that much of the writings of his predecessors had rested upon this ultimate appeal to God–metaphysics–placing philosophy in the precarious position of having its efficacy based solely upon belief in God.

The preconceived concept or preexisting idea is the a priori, or a structure in the mind that organizes perceptions.  The procedure of critique is nothing less than a Copernican Revolution, a call to reason rather than to faith, a demand for self-knowledge rather than for dogma.  Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was concerned with epistemology, establishing the grounds of knowledge, and with refuting untenable metaphysics. God does not give us the world that we see and experience.  We understand the world through reason. Knowledge is a cooperative affair—the mind organizes sense data actively and imposes reality upon the world.  We, as humans, can never hope to “see” “reality” or the “thing-in-itself.” We construct reality with our minds, which are organized at the most basic and abstract level to structure the most basic experiences, our perceptions of time and space.

There are two kinds of judgment: a priori and a posteriori.  The a priori judgment is pure and transcendent and self-evident.  It is absolutely valid and strictly necessary.  This judgment is independent of experience and is expressed in a statement in which the subject is defined by its predicate: ”The rose is a flower,” which is an analytic statement.  For Kant, the real problem for philosophy is a posteriori statements that were synthetic, that is, statements in which the predicate is not contained in the subject.  Cause and effect would come under the concept of a synthetic statement: there was no necessary connection between cause and effect.  Kant had to make an argument for cause and effect being a synthetic a priori judgment, that is a judgment that is absolute and necessary without being self-evident.   Kant argued that the mind imposes patterns and the patterns themselves are necessary.  Because the patterns are necessary, they are also transcendental.  This Aesthetic is immediate and non-discursive and sensuous, but it can be ordered and constructed by the mind.  For example, the mind has an intuition, that an immediate and sensuous, apprehension of space that is sensuous or aesthetic.

This intuition must be a priori to account for our knowledge of objects.  Thus Space is an a priori representation that underlies all outer intuitions and validates all claims of geometry, which is a science of space.  “Space” is the way the mind organizes experience.  “Space does not represent any property of things in themselves; it is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint…” and is inner and outer.  Time, like space, is another “pure form of intuition” and is the temporal ordering of experience into before and after and simultaneous.  But time is only “inner space” and is part of a spatiotemporal ordering of contents: a synthetic ordering due to the active mind’s cognition of physical objects.  This is what Kant called transcendental logic, the “putting together” (synthetic) of perceptions.  This synthetic operation makes experiences of objects possible.

In a typically Enlightenment fashion, Kant conceptually “built” an architectonic structure that would contain philosophy within a model.  Based upon reason, knowledge comes from thinking, which comes from judging.  All effective knowledge is the result of experiences of concrete sense data ordered by conceptual thinking.  According to Kant, “…thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind…” Kant was the first philosopher to distinguish between precepts and concepts, after the Cartesian duality of mind and body had proved to be untenable.  Kant then set out to establish categories of judgments, based upon Aristotelian logic.  Each form of judgment is an a priori conceptual category and the categories correspond to types of judgments.  Kant calls his arrangements the metaphysical deduction of the categories: each judgment presupposes one or another twelve synthetical (putting things together) categories or operations (such as cause and effect).

The categories are transcendental because they are rules.  These rules are not empirically observable but are necessary, because they make synthesis possible.  In other words, successive messages of data must be organized or held together into an experience or a unity of consciousness, which is the unity of self.  Experience is a combination of the self that experiences objects as a result of a priori acts of synthesis.  The human experience of objects consists of unified representations, producing objects of representation.  All knowledge demands a concept and the form of the concept must be universal and must serve as a rule.  Self and object are reciprocal.  Kant asked, “What conditions make experiences possible”?  and stated that experience is a combination of a priori concepts and empirical concepts.  The necessary conditions for “experience” is the object—sense experiences, put together into unity—and self—a collection of desires, memories, expectations, feelings, attitudes that unifies the data.  The self is also an object.  The putting together is a transcendental synthesis: objects-for-a-self.  The object is a synthesis of data of outer sense/space and the self is the synthesis of inner sense/space.

Thus, for Kant, empiricism is rehabilitated, cause and effect becomes a rule, and the function of concepts is to order the manifold of sense into meaningful and stable patterns.  The key to knowledge is order and rule that makes experience possible.  Order, in other words, must be presupposed (a priori) to make experience possible.  The world as experienced reflects patterns or categories.  Two important categories are substance and causality for human experience would not be human experience without an order that is indifferent.  We never experience these substances or the necessary connections; we experience only succession (synthesis).  Kant attributed our understanding of objects to a priori concepts through which our minds order experience with a notion of permanence and regular sequence.  His conclusions are an advance on the fallback position of Descartes that is that God “implanted” helpful innate ideas that give us reality.

If you have found this material useful, please give credit to

Dr. Jeanne S. M. Willette and Art History Unstuffed.  Thank you.

info@arthistoryunstuffed.com


Kant and the Critique of Philosophy

Kant and the Critique of Philosophy

This concept of critique was central to post-Enlightenment philosophy, coming from the Greek word “krinein”, meaning to “separate” or to “discern”, which is the origin of the word crisis.  Whereas the Greeks took the concept of critique and applied it to texts, Kant used “critique” to re-conceptualize Western philosophy at a time of crisis.  The Enlightenment had been caught between the demystification or disenchantment of a once sacred world and the secularizing of a thoroughly modern and material world, based upon scientific analysis.  For the Enlightenment philosophers, “critique” and “reason” were indivisible and Kant began a search for the conditions, which governed reasoned criticism.  Critique is a concept central to Kantian thought and is an internal analysis of a concept in its own terms. A critique, by definition, cannot be conducted from the outside, looking in; an exercise, which would be more precisely called “criticism.”  A proper critique, in contrast, must always examine given concepts and not impose ideas, alien to the argument, from the outside. The examination or interrogation of an idea—a critique—is rational and based upon the process of logical deduction and the result is the creation of an architectonic structure, an argument that is “built” systematically. The critique is a form of analysis and deduction.  Contemporary audiences are probably more familiar with the use of “critique” by the American art critic, Clement Greenberg who “interrogated” or critiqued painting, seeking its intrinsic qualities.  Through a logical analysis of what was irreducible to painting, Greenberg deduced that for painting to be pure it must be purged of alien or outside elements.  Painting, stripped of extrinsic elements, could be revealed in its basic structure, or definition, as a flat surface covered with pigment arranged in a design. As the Nineteenth Century progressed, the question shifted from how to use critique to question the nature of art to which art is worthy of critique.   A critique of philosophy is nothing less than a search for the fundamentals of how humans create knowledge.

Living a quiet and retiring life of a college professor in Weimer, Kant was, by his own account, awakened from his academic “slumber” by a challenge to Reason from an unexpected quarter.  An English philosopher, the ultimate empiricist, David Hume, who in his Treatise of Human Reason and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding pointed out that reason, like religion, is only another instrument for establishing relations among ideas.  Reason, therefore, can tell us nothing about the world.  There is no evidence that the “order” of reason is necessary and this order and “pattern” actually has no rationale in nature, which is only an object upon which we have imposed our needs.  Cause and effect were a belief system that we lived by but could not prove. If reason is only a concept and not an intrinsic quality of human thinking, if cause and effect  are unexamined assumptions then we are back to metaphysics.

As Roy Strong in The Creation of the Modern World.  The Untold Story of the British Enlightenment expressed it,

“The concept of causation was doubtless the basis of all knowledge, but causality was not itself a demonstrable fact.  Experience showed the succession of events, but did not reveal any necessity in that succession—it was habit, which created the expectation that one event would invariably follow another.  Custom was not knowledge, however, and did not strictly justify projections from the past to the future, from the known to the unknown.  Causality was thus not a principle definitively derived from the order of things but a mental postulate.”

Hume’s arguments were immediately recognized by Kant as a destructive attack on reason.  When Hume attacked the concept of cause and effect by pointing out that “cause and effect” were only a concept, not a reality, the Enlightenment was effectively over.  Rational thinking alone could not make it so.  As a believer in the powers of reason, Kant realized that he had to restore reason to its rightful place.  To refute Hume, he had to create a system for reason.

In his Critique of Pure Reason (1789), Kant discussed what he called “The Copernican Revolution” in which critique was shifted from an external focus on dogmas to a focus on the inner workings of understanding.  The scientist, Nicolas Copernicus, questioned the assumption, which was received wisdom that the sun revolved around the earth.  One could see this “truth” with one’s own eyes.  There was no discernable reason to disbelieve what seemed plain to see.  In 1530, in De Revolutionibus, Copernicus revolutionized scientific (and philosophical) thinking by putting forward the revolutionary hypothesis that the earth revolved around the sun.  This extraordinary theory, inverting general knowledge, was based upon pure abstract reasoning or deductive thinking, based upon a hypothesis that was tested and provided proof of accuracy.  The mathematics of planetary movements made sense only if one threw out the belief that the sun revolved around the earth and substituted another theory that the earth and the planets revolved around the sun. Seeing may be believing, but any belief has to be tested and proven.  Scientific reasoning is based upon theory: one formulates a hypothesis that functions as a theory that is never proved and is always provisional.  Any theory will stand until it is disproved.

For Copernicus, his new theory was far too dangerous to publicize—he would be under instant interdiction from religious authorities, and he was the kind of person who sought perfection and could never release his theory. Although in the time of Kant, two centuries later, De Revolutionibus was still on the list of books forbidden by the Catholic Church, the ideas of Copernicus were not only accepted but were “proved”.  The “revolution” in thinking about the sun and the earth was the disregard of Copernicus of empirical evidence, which suggested that the sun revolved around the earth, and his faith in a hypothesis was based upon reasoned considerations.  Like Copernicus, Kant proposed that raw observation of raw experience was insufficient as an explanation of the world and argued that the human mind was capable of ordering perception through a priori conceptions.  The rejection of the notion of the passive receptive mind was Kant’s version of the Copernican Revolution: the mind ordered the world, not vice versa.

If you have found this material useful, please give credit to

Dr. Jeanne S. M. Willette and Art History Unstuffed.  Thank you.

info@arthistoryunstuffed.com